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We examine the effect of mandatory sustainability reporting on several measures of socially responsible 
management practices. Using data for 58 countries, we show that after the adoption of mandatory 
sustainability reporting laws and regulations, the social responsibility of business leaders increases. We 
also document that both sustainable development and employee training become a higher priority for 
companies, and that corporate governance improves. Furthermore, we find that companies implement 
more ethical practices, reduce bribery and corruption, and that managerial credibility increases. These 
effects are larger for countries with stronger law enforcement and more widespread assurance of 
sustainability reports. We confirm these findings using firm-level environmental, social and governance 
metrics and a differences-in-differences research design.  
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I.  Introduction 
In the last decade, reporting of nonfinancial information has become widespread. According to the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI), only 44 firms followed GRI guidelines to report sustainability information
1 in 
2000 yet by 2010, the number of organizations releasing sustainability reports, predominantly on a 
voluntary basis, grew to 1,973.
2 Concurrently, national governments and stock exchange authorities have 
further promoted sustainability reporting by adopting laws and regulations that specifically mandate such 
reporting. In this paper, we focus on investigating whether mandatory disclosure of sustainability 
information actually has significant consequences on managerial practices. For the purposes of this study 
we term a “sustainability report” as a firm-issued general purpose non-financial report, providing 
information to investors, stakeholders (e.g., employees, customers and NGOs), and the general public 
about the firm’s activities involving environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues, either as a 
stand-alone report or as part of an integrated
3 (e.g. financial and sustainability) report. 
Concerns around the environmental impact, social responsibility, and governance of corporations 
have been on the rise for the past twenty years. In response, a growing number of regulators around the 
world are reviewing the governance arrangements of corporations to ensure that corporate conduct is 
aligned with society’s interests. Corporate reporting is one aspect of the governance structure that 
regulators are considering to change, with momentum being created behind either mandatory 
sustainability reporting (consider for example, the revision of Danish Financial Statements Act in 
Denmark and the guidelines for external reporting by state-owned companies in Sweden) or mandatory 
integrated reporting (consider here the Grenelle II Act in France and the King Code III in South Africa). 
To better understand whether mandatory sustainability reporting affects firm actions we collect data 
on laws and regulations that mandate a minimum level of disclosure on environmental, social, and 
                                                            
1The terms “sustainability”, “environmental, social and governance” (ESG), “non-financial” or “corporate social 
responsibility” (CSR) reporting have been used interchangeably in the past, to describe reports with different 
degrees of focus on environmental, social or governance issues.  
2For a complete listing of these organizations see http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportServices/GRIReportsList/. 
3An integrated report is a single document that presents and explains a company’s financial and non-financial—
environmental, social, and governance—performance (Eccles and Krzus, 2010).   3 
 
governance matters. We comprehensively search a plethora of resources and we code the year of 
enactment for the law(s) and regulation(s) we identify in each country. The data on socially responsible 
management practices
4 come from the IMD World Competitiveness Report.
5 To isolate the effect of 
mandatory reporting, we control for the level of economic development, the quality of living standards, 
the quality of governmental decisions in each country-year pair, and for year fixed effects. In addition, we 
include the lagged value of the dependent variable to account for all unobservable factors that affect the 
dependent variable prior to the enactment of the law or regulation. This way, we control for all 
unobserved historical factors that influence the level of the dependent variable before the enactment of the 
law in the focal country (Wooldridge, 2002). 
The results show that mandatory sustainability reporting effectively promotes socially responsible 
managerial practices. In particular, after the enactment of mandatory disclosure laws and regulations, 
perceptions regarding the social responsibility of business leaders improve. Moreover, we examine the 
impact on the three pillars of corporate social responsibility: environment, society, and governance. We 
find that after the enactment of mandatory disclosure employee training becomes a higher priority for 
companies (social pillar), and corporate boards supervise management more effectively (governance 
pillar). We also find directionally consistent but insignificant results for the prioritization of sustainable 
development by firms (environmental pillar). We also investigate the effect that sustainability reporting 
has on the implementation of ethical practices by businesses and on bribery and corruption, which is one 
fundamental aspect of ethical dealings within and across organizations. We find that corporations 
implement more ethical practices, and directionally consistent but insignificant results that corruption 
decreases after the enactment of mandatory disclosure laws and regulations.  
                                                            
4 We use the term socially responsible management practices to describe management practices that promote the 
environmental, social and governance performance of corporations and an ethical way of doing business. A formal 
definition of all variables can be found in Appendix 1. 
5 This database has been used in many papers examining a wide range of issues at the country-level (e.g. Alesina 
and Weder, 2002; Swift and Zadec, 2002; Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2005; Richardson, 
2006; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2011; Healy et al., 2011).  4 
 
The subsequent analysis tests whether managerial credibility increases after mandatory sustainability 
reporting. This may be the result of companies showing a heightened socially responsible behavior by 
treating employees and the environment with prudence and implementing ethical practices across their 
operations and supply chains. An increase in managerial credibility is a necessary element in forging a 
relationship of trust between business and society, which in turn is an important determinant of the 
competitiveness and economic development of nations (Knack and Keefer, 1997). We find strong results 
that managerial credibility increases following the year of mandatory sustainability reporting. 
Consistent with past literature that emphasizes the importance of enforcement (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer, 2006; Hail and Leuz, 2006), we find that the strength of the enforcement of 
government decisions moderates the effects of mandatory disclosure. Specifically, after the enactment of 
sustainability reporting, the social responsibility of business leaders increases and sustainable 
development becomes a higher priority relatively more for countries with stronger enforcement 
capabilities. The same holds true for investments in employee training, implementation of ethical 
practices, and reductions in bribery and corruption. Moreover, we find these positive effects to be stronger 
for countries where assurance of sustainability reports is more widespread. In particular, the effect on 
social responsibility, sustainable development, employee training, efficient supervision of managers by 
corporate boards, and bribery and corruption, is higher in countries where assurance is more frequent. 
Finally, we conduct a series of additional tests to assess the robustness of our results. First, we use an 
instrumental variables estimation strategy and find that the results are robust to this alternative 
identification methodology. Second, we show that the results apply to both developed and developing 
economies, albeit with higher significance in developed countries. Interestingly, the two dependent 
variables of interest that are not significantly influenced for developed countries - sustainable 
development and ethical practices - are those that are affected by the enactment of mandatory disclosure 
in developing economies. This finding is consistent with prior work on sustainable development that 
underscores the importance that such policies have particularly in developing countries (e.g. Markandya 
and Halsnaes, 2002). Third, we show that the results are robust when we include control variables for the 5 
 
development of voluntary guidelines or standards for sustainability reporting, or for laws and regulations 
that mandate disclosure about a narrow environmental, social, or governance topic. Fourth, we find 
similar results when we analyze firm-level ESG data. Using a differences-in-differences research design, 
where the control group comprises of firms that disclosed their ESG performance before the regulation, 
we find that energy, waste and water consumption decline and investments in employee training increase 
for firms that first disclosed their ESG performance after the enactment of the regulation. These results 
mitigate concerns that the effects we document here are driven by changes in the managers’ own 
perceptions rather than changes in firm conduct or by changes in other country-level regulations. 
The results of this paper contribute to the literature, to managerial practice and to policy making in 
several ways. First, to our knowledge, this study is the first to show that mandatory sustainability 
reporting may effectively promote socially responsible management practices. These findings could also 
be economically important because socially responsible managerial practices may enhance the 
competitiveness of a country by generating higher levels of trust in business and its leaders (European 
Commission, 2008; King Code of Governance Principles for South Africa, 2009). This has important 
implications for regulators and policy makers who have already mandated or are considering mandating 
sustainability or integrated reporting. For example, the European Union has consistently emphasized the 
importance of sustainable development and building trust between business and society to increase 
European competitiveness (European Commission 2001, 2005, 2006). Finally, the results suggest that 
managers may use reporting as a tool for building better and more effective communication channels 
between the firm and its stakeholders by making the firm more transparent and more accessible. 
Developing a reputation for responsible corporate behavior may also result in competitive advantages in 
labor, product, and capital markets and/or may secure the license to operate by establishing social 
legitimacy (e.g. Godfrey, 2005; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Hawn, Chatterji and Mitchell, 2011). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the motivation for this study 
and describes the history of sustainability reporting to date. Section III develops the hypotheses. Section 6 
 
IV presents the data sources and sample. Section V discusses the research design. Section VI presents the 
results and section VII concludes. 
II.  Background and Motivation 
Various ways exist to promote sustainability reporting. One option is for the regulator to be passive and 
let sustainability reporting emerge as the result of market forces. Alternatively, the regulator may choose 
to introduce a range of measures to supplement the market forces: a)  through regulations dictating 
mandatory reporting by firms; b) by providing incentives for companies to report; c) governmental 
endorsement of the GRI Guidelines
6 and  material encouragement for adoption; d) by recommending or 
proposing voluntary guidelines with or without reference to international standards such as the United 
Nations Global Compact (UNGC) and GRI; or e) by transferring the regulatory power to self-regulating 
authorities like a stock exchange, whose statutes may be either voluntary or mandatory. Across countries, 
different combinations of the above options have been implemented in recent years. However, the general 
consensus is that corporate disclosure on sustainability issues remains poor.  
 Sustainability reporting was driven, both in the US and in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, by a 
renewed awareness of external responsibilities unfulfilled by governmental institutions, and ones that 
were directly attributable to business organizations. Early experiments with social reporting, primarily in 
the Netherlands and France, paved the way for the introduction of environmental reports in countries such 
as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. During the 1980s, ethical investment funds in the UK and the US 
implemented an investment approach - broadly known as “negative screening” - that excluded firms from 
their investment universe based on their social and ethical performance. Originally applying religious 
principles, such funds excluded firms operating in the alcohol or tobacco industries. Following the 1989 
Exxon Valdez disaster, the US-based Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) 
developed The “CERES/Valdez Principles” on behalf of the Social Investment Forum (SIF), introducing 
a set of environmental reporting guidelines.  
                                                            
6 See http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Guidelines/ 7 
 
The 1990s saw increased levels of reporting with coverage becoming more comprehensive, through 
the search for new financial metrics (e.g. Rappaport, 1998; Stewart, 1999), as well as the development of 
other non-financial measures of firm value (e.g. Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Sveiby, 1997). This trend was 
best showcased by innovative and pioneering disclosures of firms such as the Body Shop International’s 
first Values Report
7 (1995) in which the firm reported on environmental, animal protection and social 
issues. In 1997, CERES and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) launched the GRI to 
develop reporting guidelines for the “triple bottom line:” economic, environmental and social 
performance. The aim was to elevate sustainability reporting to the same level and rigor as financial 
reporting. Consequently, the 1990s witnessed a growth in voluntary corporate sustainability reports. 
In more recent years, growing social (e.g., poverty, deteriorating social equality, and corruption) and 
environmental (e.g., climate change, water usage, and waste) concerns have pressured companies towards 
a more systematic treatment of sustainability reporting, disclosing how they are utilizing, developing (or 
depleting) and more generally affecting human capital and natural resources. Moreover, as a result of 
several high-profile corporate scandals and the recent global financial crisis, there has been a general 
feeling of distrust regarding companies’ ability to self-regulate (Edelman Trust Barometer, 2009) and a 
belief that existing company disclosures tell an incomplete story regarding past corporate performance 
and future prospects (e.g. Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Simnett, Vanstraelen and Chua, 2009). A broader set 
of stakeholders, including the investment community, is now demanding a more active and substantive 
role by governments in the sustainability reporting field. In parallel, information intermediaries in capital 
markets, such as sell-side analysts, increasingly integrate ESG data in their valuation models, creating 
more demand for sustainability reporting (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010).  
Another significant development has been the launch of the sustainable stock exchanges initiative by 
the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI). The initiative aims to explore how 
exchanges can work together with investors, regulators, and companies to enhance corporate transparency 
and ultimately, performance on ESG issues and to encourage responsible long-term approaches to 
                                                            
7 See: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/stakeout-at-the-body-shop-1324992.html 8 
 
investment. In January 2011, investors (belonging to the UNPRI) representing $1.6 trillion in assets under 
management, sent a letter to the top 30 stock exchanges asking them to encourage better internal 
corporate governance by firms, and disclosure of how sustainability issues are addressed at the board 
level. Investors also asked the stock exchanges to consult with firms on how to integrate sustainability 
into strategic decision-making and to encourage firms to adopt integrated reporting.
8 
In 2009, the European Commission hosted a series of multi-stakeholder workshops on ESG 
disclosure, culminating in a debate on a series of hypothetical scenarios, including some regulatory 
options, for the future of European policy on this issue. In South Africa regulators moved decisively 
towards mandating integrated reporting, with the issuance of the King III Report on Corporate 
Governance. This report was preceded by the issuance of the King Report on Corporate Governance in 
1994, and by the King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa in 2002. Finally, in the US, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued the ‘Guidance Regarding Disclosure related to 
Climate Change’ in February 2010 to clarify the existing rules by requiring companies to disclose 
material risks relating to climate change. Following the Gulf of Mexico oil spill in April 2010, the US 
government raised expectations for regulation on mandatory ESG disclosure (Ciurea, 2010). In June 
2010, the SIF asked the SEC for mandatory ESG reporting based on the GRI reporting guidelines.  
III.  Hypotheses Development  
Sustainability reporting may have two effects. First, reporting can increase transparency around the social 
and environmental impact of companies and around their governance structure. Second, reporting can 
change internal management practices by creating incentives for companies to better manage their 
relationships with employees, investors, customers, suppliers, regulators, and civil society. For this 
second effect to take place it is necessary that the first effect is substantial and that transparency of the 
firm’s ESG performance increases. Reporting of sustainability-related issues may shed light on both 
opportunities and risks that the firm is facing, but which might not have been revealed otherwise. 
Examples would include opportunities for increased efficiency through water and/or energy management, 
                                                            
8See http://www.unpri.org/files/SSE%20Letters%20to%20exchanges%20-%20public%20version.pdf 9 
 
managing reputational risks within the supply chain due to the prevention of human rights violations, or 
identifying undetected bribery and corruption activities. In other words, extensive disclosure may lead to 
increased transparency on ESG issues, which contributes towards a better understanding of how 
sustainability is linked to economic value, and a consequent change in corporate behavior towards ESG 
matters.  Garz and Volk (2007) studied sustainability reporting by 540 European firms and found that the 
process of drafting such a report itself was among the most important catalysts for organizational change, 
contributing to the accumulation of knowledge, questioning of processes, and the establishment of 
suitable structures and practices. 
Although voluntary disclosure may have firm-specific consequences, mandatory sustainability 
reporting has the potential to generate positive systemic effects at the level of society. In particular, 
forcing most companies in a country to disclose their ESG performance has the potential to systematically 
influence managerial practices across all companies in the focal country. Mandating sustainability 
reporting also constitutes a strong signal, sent from regulators to the business community, about the long-
term goals and objectives of the country as whole. For example, South African regulators, by adopting the 
King Code of Governance Principles for South Africa (2009) highlighted the importance of a need for a 
fundamental shift in the way managers and directors act.  
For the above reasons, we expect that mandating sustainability reporting will change managerial 
practices and increase the social responsibility of business leaders. Corporate social responsibility is built 
upon three foundational pillars: environmental, social and governance. Consequently, we predict that 
mandating sustainability reporting will increase the extent to which sustainable development is a priority 
for companies (environmental pillar). Sustainable development is a pattern of resource use that aims to 
meet human needs while preserving the  environment  so that these needs can be met not only in the 
present, but also for generations to come.
9 Efficient and prudent use of resources by corporations reduces 
the likelihood of higher costs in the future through tax mechanisms, and secures a corporation’s license to 
                                                            
9 The term was used by the Brundtland Commission which coined what has become the most dominant definition of 
sustainable development as development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs”. 10 
 
operate. In addition, we expect that firms will increase investments in human capital in the form of 
employee training as a result of a renewed focus on responsibly managing human capital (social pillar). 
Human capital has received increased attention in the last two decades with companies, investors and 
regulators increasingly recognizing its importance for economic development, and the United Nations 
establishing the Human Development Index. On the governance pillar, we expect that boards of directors 
will function more effectively, by considering a broader set of issues that the corporations need to address 
to be sustainable in the long-term. Effective supervision of management by the board could also be 
facilitated by directors getting more and better information on social and environmental issues.    
We also predict that businesses will implement more ethical practices and will compete in a more 
ethical way, resisting bribery and corrupt practices. Corruption is recognized to be one of the world’s 
greatest challenges. It is a major obstacle to sustainable development and is corrosive on the very fabric of 
society (UNGC, 2010). The impact of corruption on the private sector is also considerable. Corruption 
impedes economic growth, distorts competition and represents serious legal and reputational risks 
(Transparency International, 2009).   
Finally, and as a consequence of all the above effects, we expect managerial credibility to increase. 
Managers that behave in a socially responsible way will be able to build social capital and gain society’s 
trust in business. Moreover, responsible managers will be able to build long-term relationships within 
their supply chains, ensuring the sustainability not only of their own firms, but also of the ecosystem in 
which their firms are embedded. In addition, socially responsible behavior may lead to a better 
relationship of corporations with government agencies thus further enhancing managerial credibility 
within society. Sustainability reporting may also help strengthen the relationship between corporations 
and local communities by revealing the contribution of firms to the development of such communities; 
information that might not have been otherwise accessible by social actors. Disclosure of such 
information in turn, highlights the role that managers play in their local communities, and increases the 
trust and credibility with which managers are regarded. We summarize all the predictions made above in 
the following hypothesis: 11 
 
Hypothesis 1: After the enactment of mandatory sustainability reporting, corporations implement more 
socially responsible management practices. 
However, we note that it is possible that mandatory sustainability reporting is less effective than 
voluntary reporting. If regulators impose a number of required disclosures, companies may simply focus 
on meeting these requirements rather than considering core issues that are more material to their business 
in a more sophisticated or strategic way. Moreover, forcing companies to produce sustainability reports 
disrupts a separating equilibrium between companies that do not report vs. companies that do report and 
creates a pooling equilibrium where all firms report (Spence, 1973; Verrecchia, 1983). This could impair 
the signaling value of sustainability reports and impede all stakeholders’ ability to distinguish between 
firms. 
The Role of Enforcement 
Countries around the world are not homogenous in how they enact and enforce laws and regulations. 
Considerable variation exists across several dimensions that may influence the impact of mandatory 
disclosure laws and regulations. First, countries differ in terms of the mechanisms that they have in place 
to enforce laws and regulations. In fact, prior literature has documented that a variety of enforcement 
mechanisms exist and this variation leads to a differential impact of such laws and regulations on society 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2006). We expect that in countries with relatively weak 
enforcement processes, laws and regulations will have a more limited impact because firms are less likely 
to comply. Therefore, we argue that mandatory sustainability reporting will have a stronger impact on 
socially responsible management practices in countries where laws and regulations are more effectively 
enforced. 
Hypothesis 2: After the enactment of mandatory sustainability reporting, corporations implement more 
socially responsible management practices in countries with stronger law enforcement. 
The Role of Assurance 
Furthermore, countries vary with regards to the extent to which third parties provide reporting assurance. 
Financial statements are always accompanied by an audit statement from a third party, providing 12 
 
certification of the reported financial numbers. Moreover, in contrast to sustainability reports, financial 
statements can be audited only by regulated entities that have been certified and given the right to audit 
and sign financial statements. Third party assurance is considered an important element of the corporate 
reporting function and the broader corporate governance domain since it increases the credibility of the 
reported numbers; more credibility, in turn, determines the level of trust that stakeholders place on 
managerial disclosure. In addition, assurance of sustainability data is voluntary and there are no 
universally accepted auditing principles to guide the certification process of a sustainability report.
10  
Whether sustainability data are assured then, depends on the demand and supply forces for assurance 
in the market (Simnett, Vanstraelen and Chua, 2009). From a signaling perspective (Spence, 1973), firms 
may seek assurance of their sustainability reports to credibly distinguish themselves from peers that might 
engage in “green-washing” or symbolic compliance with the law, thus reducing asymmetric information 
and/or agency costs (Simnett, Vanstraelen and Chua, 2009). Other factors that may influence the firm’s 
decision to seek third party assurance include the cost of assurance, and the ability and availability of 
accounting and consulting firms to audit sustainability data.
11  
Consequently, expanded assurance by third parties after the enactment of mandatory reporting laws 
will result in more credible sustainability reports. Additionally, during the assurance engagement process, 
assurors can provide valuable insights on the robustness of management systems and practices, target-
setting procedures, and data collection mechanisms, thus improving both the way a company manages 
sustainability related issues and the associated disclosure (Corporate Register, 2008). Therefore, we 
                                                            
10 The AA1000 Assurance Standard (AA1000 AS) is a standard for assessing and strengthening the credibility and 
quality of an organization’s social, economic and environmental reporting. AA1000 AS was created by the not-for-
profit professional institute, AccountAbility, which offers assurance-related services to its members through 
working in partnership. International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE 100) was designed to provide a 
basic framework for large scale audits concerned with non-financial data process monitoring. These types of audits 
include environmental, social and sustainability reports; auditing of information systems, internal control, and 
corporate governance processes; and compliance audits for grant conditions, contracts and regulations. Three years 
later, to clarify the definition of "moderate assurance engagements," ISAE 3000 was established to further address 
ethical requirements; quality control; engagement acceptance; planning; expert materials; obtaining evidence; 
documentation; and preparing assurance reports. 
11 A certification can be a statement of reasonable or limited assurance. The evidence-gathering procedures 
for limited assurance are more restricted than for reasonable assurance. 13 
 
expect that mandatory reporting laws will have a stronger impact in countries where sustainability reports 
are more frequently assured. 
Hypothesis 3: After the enactment of mandatory sustainability reporting, corporations implement more 
socially responsible management practices in countries where a higher percentage of sustainability 
reports are assured. 
IV.  Data and Sample 
We collected data on laws and regulations that mandate sustainability reporting in three stages. First, we 
collected country-level laws and regulations that mandate some type of environmental, social, and/or 
governance disclosure. The most useful resources to locate these laws and regulations were local or 
regional websites that describe sustainability reporting in each country. We also examined relevant 
publications that collect data on reporting laws and regulations around the world.  These included the 
Carrots and Sticks for Starters – Current Trends and Approaches in Voluntary and Mandatory Standards 
for Sustainability Reporting report prepared by KPMG and the UNEP, the Carrots and Sticks – 
Promoting Transparency and Sustainability report prepared by KPMG, the Unit for Corporate 
Governance in Africa, the GRI, the UNEP, and the book The World Guide to CSR: A Country-by-Country 
Analysis of Corporate Sustainability and Responsibility. For some countries, the websites of the national 
government and/or the legislative branch, and/or the national stock exchange, also proved valuable 
resources for reading about and accurately classifying the relevant laws and regulations. In stage two, the 
authors jointly reviewed each of the candidate laws and regulations on that list to confirm that the law or 
regulation mandated reporting of corporate sustainability data and to verify the year in which it was 
enacted. In stage three, for cases where the law or regulation was not clear about the reporting 
requirements, we reviewed actual disclosures from companies domiciled in the country that the law or 
regulation was enacted to ensure that it had an effect on reporting practices. After this third stage, we 
arrived at the final list of laws and regulations. The first country to adopt a mandatory sustainability 
reporting law in the sample is Finland, in 1997. Other countries that adopted a law in the sample are: 
Australia, Austria, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, 14 
 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Appendix 2 shows all mandatory and 
voluntary reporting guidelines around ESG issues that we were able to find. 
We collected other country-level data from the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY)
12, 
which analyzes and ranks the ability of nations to create and maintain an environment that sustains the 
competitiveness of enterprises. The yearbook benchmarks the performance of 58 countries based on more 
than 300 criteria measuring different facets of competitiveness. Approximately two thirds of the data 
come from statistical databases (international/national sources) and the remaining third from surveys 
(Executive Opinion Survey). Statistical indicators are acquired from international, national and regional 
organizations, private institutions and a network of 54 partner institutes worldwide.  
Whereas the statistical indicators show how competitiveness is measured over a specific period of 
time, the survey data measure competitiveness as it is perceived within society. The survey is designed to 
quantify issues that are not easily measurable, such as management practices, labor relations, corruption, 
environmental concerns, and quality of life. The survey responses reflect perceptions of competitiveness 
by business executives who are dealing with international business situations. The Executive Opinion 
Survey is sent to executives in top and middle management positions in all of the economies covered by 
the WCY. The surveys are sent in January and are returned in April. In order to be statistically 
representative, IMD selects a sample size that is proportional to the GDP of each economy. The sample of 
respondents is representative of the entire economy, covering a cross-section of the business community 
in each economic sector: primary, manufacturing, and services, based on their contribution to the GDP of 
the economy. The survey respondents are nationals or expatriates, located in local and foreign enterprises 
in the country and which in general, also have an international operating dimension. They are asked to 
evaluate the present and expected competitiveness conditions of the economy in which they operate and 
                                                            
12 The sample includes the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, 
Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. For more information, see 
http://www.imd.org/research/publications/wcy/index.cfm 15 
 
have resided during the previous year, drawing from their extensive international experience, thereby 
ensuring that the evaluations portray an in-depth knowledge of their particular environment.  
Finally, we collected data on assurance practices from the GRI.
13 Out of all companies that publish 
sustainability reports as of 2008
14 we counted the number of reports that have been assured by a third 
party. This number represents a proxy for the level of corporate commitment to sustainability because we 
expect that companies spending more time addressing sustainability risks and opportunities will be more 
likely to certify their reports. A higher percentage of assured reports is also a signal of corporate 
sophistication because assurors are likely to improve both the way companies manage sustainability 
related issues and the associated disclosures. Moreover, the percentage of reports that have been assured 
represents a proxy for the level of credibility of the reports in each country.  
V.  Research Design 
To identify the consequences of mandatory sustainability reporting laws we use panel data that extend 
from 1995 to 2008, or for fewer years depending on the availability of data for the various dependent 
variables.
15 To control for other correlated omitted factors that might influence the dependent variables, 
we control for the contemporaneous fundamental economic conditions in each country. The control 
variables include the natural logarithm of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP per capital
16, and the 
unemployment rate. We also control for the quality of governmental decisions, by including a variable 
that measures the adaptability of government decisions to changing business conditions. Moreover, we 
control for the general quality of living conditions in each country by including a variable measuring life 
expectancy at birth. We also include the lagged value of the dependent variable, measured at the first 
available year and always before the enactment of the law, as an independent variable to control for 
                                                            
13 While not all sustainability reports are covered by GRI, we believe this is a reasonable measure of assurance 
practices across countries. This is because the largest corporations, which are more likely to provide an assurance 
statement with their report, report under the GRI principles. 
14 We concentrated on 2008 to measure assurance practices after the enforcement of laws. Measuring assurance 
practices in 2006, 2007 or 2009 makes no difference for our analysis. 
15 In particular, for sustainable development and ethical practices data is available for the period 2000-2008. For the 
remaining dependent variables the sample covers the full 1995-2008 period.  
16 Both measures are denominated in US $. Redefining these two measures in a purchasing power parity basis does 
not affect our results. 16 
 
persistent unobservable differences in the dependent variable across countries (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Effectively, we isolate all unobserved historical factors that influence the level of the dependent variable 
before the enactment of the law. Finally, we include year fixed effects to eliminate any systematic 
variation in the dependent variables across years. The estimated model is: 
CountryMeasureit=αt +β x Reportingit+Σ γ x Controlit+δ x CountryMeasureit-τ+eit   (1) 
where i is country i, t is year t, and Reportingit takes the value of one for country-year observations in the 
year following the enactment of a mandatory sustainability reporting law or regulation, or otherwise is 
zero. A positive and significant coefficient β shows that mandatory sustainability reporting positively 
impacts the dependent variable. 
VI.  Results 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for all the variables that we use in our specifications. All variables are 
defined in Appendix 1. On average, countries score higher on prioritizing sustainable development (mean 
= 6.38), and the credibility of managers in society also tends to be higher (mean = 6.12) than the rest of 
the dependent variables. With regards to sustainable development, Singapore, Austria, and Denmark are 
on the top of the list, if we take the average score over all the years in the sample, whereas Venezuela, 
Argentina, and Italy are at the bottom. Similarly, Singapore, Finland, and Denmark, top the list for the 
credibility of managers in society, whereas Russia, Poland, and the Czech Republic are at the bottom.  
Countries score lower, on average, on the absence of bribery and corruption (mean = 4.80) and on the 
perceived social responsibility of business leaders (mean = 5.58). More specifically, Venezuela, Russia, 
and Romania are at the bottom of the list for the absence of bribery and corruption, whereas Denmark, 
Finland, and New Zealand are at the top. Furthermore, when we consider the perceived social 
responsibility of business leaders, Russia, Romania, and Poland score the lowest, whereas Denmark, 
Austria, and Sweden score the highest. About 11% of the observations in the sample are effectively used 
as our treatment group; the Reporting indicator is equal to one at the corresponding firm-year 17 
 
observations, starting at the year after the enactment of the disclosure law or regulation. Assurance, the 
percentage of GRI-compliant sustainability reports that are assured by a third party has a mean of 14%.  
Indicatively, 37.5% of the reports were assured by third parties in Finland, 35.3% in Austria, 32.5% in 
Italy and 29.7% in Taiwan. The list of countries with essentially no third party assurance of the reports 
includes countries like Indonesia, Thailand, Jordan, Venezuela and the Philippines.  
The Enforcement indicator, which takes the value of one for countries that score above the median 
level of enforcement of government decisions, has a mean of 0.53 (or 53%). Singapore, Denmark, and 
Finland are the countries with the strongest enforcement score, whereas Venezuela, Argentina, and the 
Philippines are the countries with weakest law enforcement. Finally, the mean per capita GDP stands at 
$19,598 and a standard deviation of $16,971, indicating considerable variation of living standards across 
the 58 countries in our sample. 
  Table 2 shows univariate correlations for all the variables used in the analysis. The Reporting 
indicator is positively correlated with all the dependent variables of interest ((1) – (7)). As expected, the 
Enforcement variable is also positively correlated with the dependent variables, and to a lesser magnitude 
so is the Assurance variable. In addition, per capita GDP as well as the Adaptability of government 
policy, and Life expectancy at birth are positively correlated with the dependent variables of interest, 
indicating that countries with higher living standards or countries with governments that are more 
responsive in terms of enacting and implementing laws and regulations overall, are associated with higher 
scores on the sustainability country-level measures. The natural logarithm of GDP, a proxy for country 
size and economic development, is marginally correlated with the independent variables, and this 
correlation is positive or negative. 
  Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients of model (1), our baseline specification. Column (1) 
shows that the coefficient on Reporting is positive and significant (0.307, p-value<0.01); after mandatory 
sustainability reporting, the perceived social responsibility of business leaders increases. In column (2), 
the coefficient is positive but insignificant: we do not find a statistically reliable effect of mandatory 
disclosure on the prioritization of sustainable development by firms.  On the other hand, the coefficient on 18 
 
Reporting  is positive and highly significant in columns (3) and (4); after mandatory sustainability 
reporting, employee training becomes a higher priority (0.260, p-value<0.01) and boards of directors 
supervise managers more effectively (0.214, p-value<0.01). In column (5), the coefficient on Reporting is 
positive and significant, suggesting that implementation of ethical practices by corporations increases 
(0.195, p-value<0.01) and in column (6) the coefficient on Reporting is positive but insignificant when 
the dependent variable is the absence of bribery and corruption. Column (7) shows that managerial 
credibility in society increases after mandatory sustainability reporting (0.207, p-value<0.01).
17   
In unreported results, to better understand the timing of the effect on our dependent variables, we 
estimate additional specifications that capture the effect of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 5+ years after the enactment of 
the law (i.e. we introduce indicator variables to characterize the 1st, the 2nd, the 3rd and so forth year 
post-enactment) using the same controls as in Table 3. The findings are theoretically consistent with our 
argument: social responsibility and managerial credibility - what we consider as outcome variables - are 
affected by the law predominantly in later years as indicated by the significance of the 4-, 5-year and 5+ 
years post-enactment effects. On the other hand, corporate boards and ethical practices are beginning to 
be affected in earlier years, while sustainable development, employee training and bribery and corruption 
obtain more about 3 years post-enactment.  
Across all specifications, the coefficients on the Lagged dependent variable are positive, highly 
significant and in the range of 0.50 to 0.75, suggesting that these country characteristics exhibit time 
variation but also high persistence. All else equal, countries with higher GDP score lower on Managerial 
credibility, (p-value<0.01), Bribery and corruption (p-value<0.01) and Corporate boards (p-value<0.05). 
GDP per capita enters the regressions consistently with a positive coefficient. Adaptability of government 
policy also enters all the models with a positive coefficient, as expected. Life expectancy at birth and the 
                                                            
17 These results are even stronger if we exclude from the sample of countries that have adopted laws and regulations 
for sustainability reporting, EU countries, such as Greece, that have transposed the Directive 2003/51/EC. The 
European law makes the following requirement on companies: “To the extent necessary for an understanding of the 
company's development, performance or position, the analysis [in the annual review] shall include both financial 
and, where appropriate, non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the particular business, including 
information relating to environmental and employee matters”, but it has been criticized for failing to change 
companies’ disclosure practices (Serafeim, Eccles, and Andrews, 2011). 19 
 
Unemployment rate do not enter the models with coefficients of consistent sign. Finally, the baseline 
specification of Table 3 explains a considerable part of the variation in the dependent variables, ranging 
from 60.6% for the effectiveness of corporate boards, to 91.3% for bribery and corruption. 
The Role of Enforcement 
In Table 4 we introduce a new variable - the interaction between the Reporting indicator and the 
Enforcement indicator - to capture the marginal effect that enforcement mechanisms have on the 
dependent variables of interest in countries that mandate sustainability reporting. Consistent with our 
expectations, we find that in countries with mandatory sustainability reporting and strong enforcement 
mechanisms, perceived social responsibility of business leaders increases (0.449, p-value<0.01), the 
prioritization of sustainable development increases (0.455, p-value<0.01), and investments in employee 
training increase (1.015, p-value<0.01) by more relative to countries with low enforcement. We also find 
that enforcement moderates the relationship between Reporting and the implementation of ethical 
practices (0.329, p-value<0.1) as well as the relationship with bribery and corruption (0.372, p-
value<0.1). The coefficient on the interaction term Reporting*Enforcement is insignificant when the 
dependent variable is Corporate Boards or Managerial Credibility. Interestingly, in countries with low 
enforcement mandatory sustainability reporting has no reliable effect and the coefficient in some cases is 
negative. Taken together, the results of Table 4 confirm the moderating role of Enforcement and highlight 
that the positive effects that we documented in Table 3 are amplified in the presence of strong law 
enforcement. 
The Role of Assurance 
Table 5 investigates the role of assurance of sustainability reports in moderating the relationship between 
sustainability reporting and socially responsible management practices. To make sure that assurance has 
an incremental effect over and above any effect that enforcement has we also include in the specification 
the interaction of Reporting and Enforcement. Not including Enforcement in the estimation would cast 
doubt as to whether the coefficient on Assurance suffers from a correlated omitted variables problem 
because of Enforcement. We find that in countries that mandate sustainability reporting, assurance has a 20 
 
positive marginal effect on our dependent variables. In particular, we find that sustainability reporting 
improves perceptions of social responsibility (1.091, p-value<0.1), puts emphasis on sustainable 
development by corporations (1.669, p-value<0.01), increases investments in human capital (1.064, p-
value<0.1), and the effectiveness of corporate boards’ supervision of management (0.990, p-value<0.1) 
more in countries where a high percentage of the reports are assured. Moreover, the coefficient on the 
interaction term between Reporting and Assurance is positive and significant suggesting that the 
perceived levels of bribery and corruption are reduced following mandatory sustainability reporting 
(2.270, p-value<0.01). We note that in the specifications of Table 5, we also control for the impact of 
enforcement; similar to Table 4, the coefficient on the interaction term between Reporting and 
Enforcement remains positive and highly significant for most of the columns. Our results therefore, 
highlight the moderating role of assurance in addition to the moderating role of enforcement.  
Instrumental Variables Estimation 
One concern with the analysis so far, is that Reporting might be correlated with the error term because we 
have been unable to control for time-varying country characteristics that may correlate both with 
Reporting and the dependent variables. To control for this type of endogeneity bias, we use instrumental 
variables developed by La Porta et al. (1998). Legal systems with European origins can be classified into 
four major legal families: the English common law countries, and the French, German, and Scandinavian 
civil law countries (Reynolds and Flores, 1996). All four legal families descend from the Roman law as 
compiled by Byzantine Emperor Justinian in the sixth century, and from interpretations and applications 
of this law in subsequent centuries. The four legal families developed distinct characteristics during the 
last four centuries. The English legal system is based on common law, where the laws were primarily 
formed by judges trying to resolve particular cases. Through colonialism, it was spread to Australia, 
Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, North America, South Africa, Thailand and many African nations. The 
French civil code was written in 1804, following the directions of Napoleon. Through occupation, it was 
adopted by other European countries, such as Italy and Poland, and through its influence on the Spanish 
and Portuguese legal systems, the legal French tradition spread to Latin America. Through colonization, it 21 
 
was adopted in many African countries, and Caribbean nations. The German civil code was completed 
almost in 1896, and influenced Austria, Switzerland, China, Taiwan, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
Hungary. Also, the German civil code influenced the Japanese civil code, which helped spread the 
German legal tradition to South Korea. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the Scandinavian countries formed 
their own legal codes.  
There are two conditions under which the legal origin variables serve as appropriate instruments for 
the enactment of mandatory sustainability reporting laws and regulations. First, they have to be 
exogenous to socially responsible management practices during our sample period (exogeneity condition). 
Second, they have to be correlated with the enactment of mandatory sustainability reporting laws and 
regulations (relevance condition). In terms of exogeneity, the English, French, and German legal systems 
were spread mainly through occupation and colonialism. Thus, we take the legal origin of a country as an 
exogenous endowment. In terms of relevance, a body of evidence suggests that legal origin determines 
regulatory strategies. La Porta et al. (1998) show that the legal origin of a country influences its legal 
treatment of shareholders, the laws governing creditor rights, the efficiency of contract enforcement, and 
accounting standards. French legal origin countries tend to have weak shareholder and creditor rights, and 
less comprehensive company financial statements compared to countries with other legal origins.  
Table 6 Panel A shows the results of the first-stage estimation. Panel B shows the results of the 
second-stage estimation. In Panel A, the instruments are highly relevant. The F-statistic on all instruments 
is in the range of 14 to 15 (p-value<0.01), across all specifications. In Panel B, the coefficient on the 
exogenous component of Reporting is positive and significant across all specifications, except for Ethical 
Practices. Both Sustainable Development and Bribery and Corruption are now significantly associated 
with Reporting. Exogeneity of the instruments is not rejected, suggesting that the instruments are valid. 
The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is 2.86 (p-value=0.24) for the specification where Social 
Responsibility is the dependent variable.  
In unreported results, we use an alternative instrument, to further examine the robustness of our 
results. We estimate the economic cost of damages caused by natural disasters in each country between 22 
 
1980 and 1999. We collect these data from the International Disaster Database provided by the Center for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. We expect that this is an exogenous instrument as natural 
disasters are exogenous events that are not related to managerial practices. Moreover, countries with more 
severe natural disasters might be less likely to mandate sustainability reporting because in these countries 
firms are more likely to engage in philanthropic activities and report on them on a voluntary basis as a 
response to relief efforts. As a result, in this environment, regulators might be less likely to mandate 
sustainability reporting. The countries with the highest damages from natural disasters are the US, Japan, 
China and Italy. The countries with the highest damages from natural disasters are Singapore, Finland, 
and Iceland. We find that the natural logarithm of the economic cost of natural disasters is related to 
Reporting. The t-statistic of the coefficient on the economic cost of natural disasters is in the range of 
three to four, suggesting that the instrument is relevant. Because we have one instrument we are unable to 
conduct an exogeneity test. However, we believe that it is reasonable to expect that natural disasters are 
exogenous to changes in socially responsible managerial practices. The results of the second-stage 
estimation show that the coefficient on Reporting is positive and significant across all specifications. 
Overall, the results of the instrumental variables specification suggest that the results are robust to 
alternative identification strategies. 
Developed vs. Developing Countries 
Table 7 offers an exploratory subsample analysis by examining the potentially differential impact that 
mandatory disclosure may have on developed and developing countries. Panel A of Table 7 refers to the 
subsample of countries that we classified as “developed” (i.e. countries whose average per-capita GDP for 
the sample period was above the median per capita GDP across all countries in our sample), whereas 
panel B presents results for developing countries (i.e. countries whose average per-capita GDP for the 
sample period was below the median per capita GDP). We find that for developed countries, mandatory 
sustainability reporting improves perceptions of social responsibility (0.377, p-value<0.01), increases 
investments in human capital (0.327, p-value<0.01), improves the monitoring effectiveness of corporate 
boards (0.286, p-value<0.01), decreases the perceived levels of bribery and corruption (0.257, p-23 
 
value<0.1), and increases managerial credibility within society (0.223, p-value<0.01). For developing 
countries, sustainability reporting impacts the prioritization of sustainable development by firms in the 
country (0.396, p-value<0.01) and the implementation of ethical practices (0.647, p-value<0.10). 
Taken together, panels A and B seem to suggest that there are different mechanisms at play within 
developed countries that characterize the extent to which mandatory disclosure laws and regulations lead 
to changes in socially responsible managerial practices. For example, developed countries may be 
governed by a distinct set of institutions that facilitate a more effective, credible and rapid dissemination 
of information within society and therefore, have a larger impact. In contrast, in developing countries 
such institutions may be absent thus assessment of socially responsible managerial practices by society 
may occur less rapidly and/or require more time for verification of its real impact. 
Mandatory vs. Voluntary Guidelines 
Some countries have adopted a different approach towards promoting sustainability reporting. Instead of 
mandating disclosure of sustainability information, they have issued voluntary guidelines to assist 
companies with publishing sustainability reports. We collected data about voluntary guidelines and 
standards employing the same three stage process that we used to collect data on mandatory sustainability 
reporting laws and regulations. Examples of voluntary guidelines include the Guide for Preparing 
Sustainability Reports in Chile, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Social Responsibility Guidelines for Listed 
Companies in China, the CSR Notice for financial institutions in India, and the Guidelines for the 
Integration of Social and Environmental Activities in the Financial Reporting of Companies in New 
Zealand.
18 In unreported results, we reproduced the basic specifications of Table 3 and included an 
additional variable, Voluntary Reporting, to control for the impact of voluntary sustainability reporting 
guidelines or standards.  The coefficients on Reporting remain virtually unchanged and the coefficient on 
Voluntary Reporting is positive and significant for some of the dependent variables. All else equal, 
voluntary sustainability reporting increases the perceived social responsibility of business leaders, 
                                                            
18 Twelve countries have adopted throughout our sample period voluntary guidelines for sustainability reporting. 24 
 
increases investments in employee training and, improves the monitoring effectiveness of corporate 
boards. 
Specialized Laws and Regulations 
During the period covered by the sample, some countries
19 adopted laws and regulations that pertained to 
specific ESG issues or specific industries. For example, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 
1999 required firms to report on specific pollutant emissions; in Denmark, the Green Accounts Act of 
1995 required certain listed firms to draw up green accounts and to include a statement from the 
authorities; in the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposed a number of new reporting requirements 
for listed firms around corporate governance. These laws and regulations were also identified with the 
same three stage process that we implemented for mandatory sustainability reporting laws and 
regulations. To control for the impact that such specialized laws and regulations may have on our 
dependent variables of interest, we constructed an indicator variable that for each country, takes the value 
of one for all the years after the year of enactment of such laws and regulations. In unreported results, we 
again reproduced the specifications of Table 3 with this control variable and we found that the 
coefficients on Reporting remain unchanged with the exception of the specification for Sustainable 
Development, where it becomes significant at the 10% level. The coefficient on the indicator variable for 
specialized laws and regulations is insignificant across almost all specifications indicating that the main 
impact on the dependent variables originates from the broader sustainability reporting laws and 
regulations, rather than these specialized ones. 
Firm-level Analysis 
The evidence so far suggests that sustainability reporting has an effect on managerial practices. However, 
there are a number of alternative explanations for the results we documented. For example, it seems likely 
that simply the act of having to measure and disclose sustainability measures could affect reported 
perceptions of how effectively the firm was handling these issues. Moreover, if mandatory disclosure is 
part of a concerted effort by governments to improve sustainability then improvements in other aspects of 
                                                            
19 In total, fourteen countries in our sample adopted such specialized laws and regulations. 25 
 
the regulatory environment will be correlated with mandatory reporting, lessening the ability to tie the 
results to mandatory reporting.  
To control for these alternative explanations we use firm-level data that are not based on managerial 
perceptions but on actual firm ESG performance. The use of firm-level data allows us to perform a 
differences-in-differences analysis by constructing groups that should be affected by mandatory reporting 
and firms in the same country that should be affected by relatively less. The firm-level data were provided 
to us by Thomson Reuters ASSET4, one of the main providers of ESG data to investment firms. ASSET4 
provides data on the ESG performance of large corporations around the world since 2002 and it has 
expanded its coverage over the years to include more than 3,000 companies. This dataset provides us with 
measures of sustainable development (energy used, waste and water consumption), employee training 
(training hours and training costs), and corporate governance (attendance of board meetings). 
To construct a control group that would be affected relatively less, if at all, by the reporting 
regulation, we identify firms that voluntarily disclosed before the regulation their sustainability 
performance. For example, when we test for the effect of mandatory reporting on employee training for 
French companies we identify French companies that disclosed training hours for their employees before 
2003 (see Appendix 2 for the regulation). We assume that these companies’ employee training practices 
will be less affected by the regulation because they already disclose the hours their employees spend 
training. This is the control group and we label it “Disclosure”. Next, we identify French firms that started 
disclosing training hours in 2003. We assume that these firms were compelled to disclose as a result of 
the new regulation. This is the treatment group and we label it “New Disclosure”. We hypothesize that 
firms in the New Disclosure group will increase investments in employee training in the future after the 
enactment of the law. To control for inter-temporal changes in employee training that are influenced by 
other unrelated factors, we calculate the change in training hours per employee also for the Disclosure 
group. The change in training hours for the New Disclosure group minus the change in training hours for 
the Disclosure group is the differences-in-differences estimate. If year t is the first year of mandatory 
reporting we estimate the effect in year t+2 to allow enough time for reporting to change managerial 26 
 
practices. Ideally, we would estimate the effect in later years but our data do not allow us to move beyond 
year t+2 because the sample decreases significantly. 
Table 8 shows the results of the analysis. We present average firm performance across the 
sustainability metrics for the two groups of firms at year t and at year t+2. Moreover, we calculate the 
differences-in-differences estimate and the statistical significance for each measure. Panels A-C present 
estimates for measures of sustainable development. Energy use, waste generation, and water consumption 
all decline relatively more for the New Disclosure group, consistent with mandatory reporting 
incentivizing managers to improve their firms’ environmental performance. Training hours and costs per 
employee increase relatively more for the New Disclosure group suggesting that mandatory reporting 
affects investments in employees (Panels D and E). Although board attendance increases more for the 
New Disclosure group this result is insignificant (Panel F). In summary, these results are consistent with 
the country-level analysis. 
VII.  Discussion 
In this paper, we have provided evidence for the positive impact of mandatory sustainability reporting on 
socially responsible management practices. In particular, we show that mandatory disclosure of 
sustainability information leads to a) an increase in the social responsibility of business leaders, b) a 
prioritization of sustainable development, c) a prioritization of employee training, d) more efficient 
supervision of managers by boards of directors, e) an increase in the implementation of ethical practices 
by firms, e) a decrease in bribery and corruption, and f) an improvement of managerial credibility within 
society. We also find that these effects are larger for countries that have stronger enforcement 
mechanisms and countries where assurance of sustainability data is more frequent. 
We note a number of caveats that could potentially affect our results. First, the laws and regulations 
that we include in our analysis are likely to have smaller effects compared to the possible effects of laws 
and regulations that institute more specific requirements across all companies or laws that mandate 
integrated reporting. Such laws and regulations are more likely to expand sustainability reporting 
considerably and, in the case of integrated reporting, force companies to embed sustainability in their 27 
 
strategy and operations (Eccles and Krzus, 2010). Moreover, laws and regulations that mandate 
sustainability reporting are likely to generate effects that take a number of years to materialize, making it 
more difficult for researchers to detect these effects. If this is the case, then the results of this paper 
underestimate the effects of sustainability reporting.  
Another concern relates to the nature of most of our dependent variables, which are perceptions of 
managerial practices rather than variables generated from hard data; the concern here is that reporting 
might impact perceptions without necessarily changing the underlying reality. However, we believe this is 
unlikely for several reasons.  First, positive effects on the dependent variables of interest are likely to be 
transient and non-systematic if expectations about socially responsible management practices are not 
eventually met by corporate actions. Should such information turn out to be invalid, then perceptions will 
adjust. In our sample we have data that, on average, extend for five years after the adoption of mandatory 
sustainability reporting, allowing for these reversals to happen. In addition, the emergence of third parties 
who check and certify sustainability reports (Simnett, Vanstraelen and Chua, 2009), signals the increasing 
legitimacy and credibility of communicating ESG information to stakeholders. This kind of assurance and 
external validation of sustainability disclosures makes us more confident that the dependent variables 
characterize real firm actions as opposed to symbolic management (e.g. Westphal and Zajac, 1994, 1998). 
Importantly, to further alleviate this concern, we analyze firm-level data that do not represent managerial 
perceptions and we find consistent results. 
  The findings reported in this paper suggest that sustainability reporting not only increases 
transparency but can also change corporate behavior. Disclosure of ESG information forces companies to 
manage these matters effectively in order to avoid having to disclose bad ESG performance to their 
multiple stakeholders. An implication for regulators is that if they want companies to perform better on 
ESG metrics then reporting could be a useful means to achieve this objective. An implication for 
companies is that reporting could change the way they conduct business. If better ESG performance 
provides a competitive advantage and leads to better long-term financial performance (Eccles et al., 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
              
Social Responsibility  5.58 1.07 2.53  7.87 
Sustainable Development  6.38  1.09  3.06  9.07 
Employee Training  5.78  1.06  2.95  8.22 
Corporate Boards  5.74  0.93  3.07  8.15 
Ethical Practices  6.02  1.29  3.09  8.32 
Bribery & corruption  4.80  2.67  0.34  9.65 
Managerial Credibility  6.12 1.00 2.48  8.33 
Reporting 0.11  0.31  0  1 
Enforcement 0.53  0.50  0  1 
Assurance 0.14  0.17  0  1 
Log of total GDP  5.52  1.40  1.82  9.57 
GDP per capita  19,598  16,971  374  11,9741 
Life expectancy at birth  75.19  5.45  48.00  83.00 
Adaptability of government policy 4.81  1.44  0.80  9.25 
Unemployment rate  7.53  4.67  0.90  31.35 
 
All variables are defined in Appendix 1.33 
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix 
Variable (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
(1)  Social Responsibility  1                                        
(2)  Sustainable Development  0.76 1                                     
(3)  Employee Training  0.82 0.79  1                                  
(4)  Corporate Boards  0.73 0.63 0.61  1                               
(5)  Ethical Practices  0.88 0.74 0.79 0.77 1                            
(6)  Bribery and Corruption  0.75 0.72 0.72 0.66  0.87 1                         
(7)  Managerial Credibility  0.80 0.66 0.68 0.80 0.80 0.69 1                      
(8)  Reporting  0.36 0.27 0.35 0.28 0.43 0.42 0.27  1                   
(9)  Enforcement  0.60 0.58 0.51 0.57 0.65 0.67 0.59  0.31 1                
(10)  Assurance  0.06 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.11  0.14 -0.03 1             
(11)  Log of total GDP  0.03 -0.02 0.06 -0.08 0.14 0.02 -0.04  0.20 -0.02 0.13 1          
(12)  GDP per capita  0.52 0.41 0.55 0.35 0.62 0.71 0.45  0.43 0.43 0.16 0.17 1       
(13)  Life expectancy at birth  0.30 0.27 0.31 0.19 0.44 0.61 0.30  0.28 0.34 0.13 0.16 0.63 1    
(14)  Adaptability of government policy  0.52 0.65 0.47 0.58 0.49 0.50 0.60  0.09 0.54 0.07 -0.19 0.20 0.07 1 
(15) Unemployment  rate  -0.31 -0.38 -0.37 -0.26 -0.34 -0.41 -0.31  -0.14 -0.31 -0.21 -0.13 -0.41 -0.54 -0.27 
 
All variables are defined in Appendix 1.   34 
 
Table 3: Effect of Mandatory Sustainability Reporting 














Reporting  0.307***  0.105  0.260*** 0.214*** 0.195***  0.143  0.207*** 
    (0.079)  (0.091)  (0.088) (0.070) (0.066) (0.128) (0.072) 
Lagged dependent variable  0.718***  0.484***  0.633*** 0.522*** 0.751*** 0.698*** 0.509*** 
    (0.030)  (0.046)  (0.026) (0.031) (0.032) (0.021) (0.027) 
Log of total GDP  0.018  -0.035  -0.004  -0.039**  -0.003  -0.081***  -0.044*** 
    (0.017)  (0.023)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.016) 
GDP per capita  0.009***  0.005*  0.020***  0.005***  0.005**  0.027***  0.012*** 
    (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
Life expectancy at birth  -0.012*  -0.011  -0.035***  0.000  0.022***  0.054***  0.004 
    (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) 
Adaptability of government policy  0.196***  0.238***  0.151*** 0.202*** 0.159*** 0.234*** 0.200*** 
    (0.019)  (0.028)  (0.017) (0.020) (0.023) (0.029) (0.018) 
Unemployment rate  -0.003  -0.032***  -0.010*  0.002  0.006  0.014*  0.003 
    (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) 
Constant 1.146**  3.387***  3.627***  1.850***  -1.088**  -3.612***  1.730*** 
    (0.477)  (0.648)  (0.493) (0.461) (0.525) (0.775) (0.442) 
Year  fixed  effects  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  689  464  688 689 464 689 689 
R-squared  71.7%  67.5%  71.8% 60.6% 84.0% 91.3% 70.2% 
OLS regressions. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.  All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 





Table 4: Moderating Role of Enforcement 














Reporting -0.145  -0.305  -0.664***  0.204  -0.101  -0.251  0.054 
    (0.158)  (0.203)  (0.170) (0.163) (0.157) (0.203) (0.117) 
Reporting * Enforcement   0.449***  0.455**  1.015***  -0.046  0.329*  0.372*  0.142 
    (0.173)  (0.212)  (0.186) (0.175) (0.171) (0.224) (0.141) 
Lagged dependent variable  0.658***  0.453***  0.610*** 0.466*** 0.724*** 0.658*** 0.484*** 
    (0.031)  (0.048)  (0.026) (0.033) (0.034) (0.021) (0.028) 
Enforcement    0.345***  0.125  0.133**  0.323*** 0.108 0.595***  0.147*** 
    (0.058)  (0.079)  (0.055) (0.058) (0.073) (0.086) (0.055) 
Log of total GDP  0.020  -0.031  0.000  -0.035**  0.002  -0.078***  -0.041** 
    (0.017)  (0.023)  (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.016) 
GDP per capita  0.008***  0.004*  0.019***  0.004**  0.005**  0.025***  0.011*** 
    (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
Life expectancy at birth  -0.015**  -0.011  -0.035***  -0.003  0.021***  0.052***  0.003 
    (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) 
Adaptability of government policy  0.151***  0.225*** 0.130***  0.170***  0.146*** 0.169*** 0.186*** 
    (0.020)  (0.030)  (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.027) (0.018) 
Unemployment  rate  -0.002 -0.032***  -0.010* 0.004  0.007 0.016** 0.003 
    (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) 
Constant 1.765***  3.625***  3.782***  2.373***  -0.866  -3.247***  1.975*** 
    (0.494)  (0.683)  (0.498) (0.476) (0.537) (0.717) (0.456) 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  689  464  688 689 464 689 689 
R-squared  73.5%  68.0%  73.0% 62.3% 84.2% 92.1% 70.6% 
 
OLS regressions. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 36 
 
Table 5: Moderating Role of Assurance 














Reporting -0.378*  -0.617**  -0.890***  -0.014  -0.020  -0.693**  -0.031 
    (0.219)  (0.272)  (0.249) (0.222) (0.183) (0.330) (0.180) 
Reporting * Assurance  1.091*  1.669**  1.064*  0.990*  -0.395  2.270**  0.369 
    (0.607)  (0.650)  (0.645) (0.577) (0.478) (0.996) (0.659) 
Assurance 0.061  -0.658***  -0.031  0.151  0.038  -0.700***  0.121 
    (0.096)  (0.184)  (0.104) (0.096) (0.123) (0.267) (0.097) 
Reporting * Enforcement   0.460**  0.479*  1.031***  -0.036  0.321**  0.400  0.145 
    (0.205)  (0.244)  (0.216) (0.215) (0.163) (0.263) (0.146) 
Enforcement    0.353***  0.078  0.137**  0.340*** 0.107 0.549***  0.158*** 
    (0.058)  (0.082)  (0.055) (0.058) (0.073) (0.092) (0.055) 
Lagged dependent variable  0.661***  0.463***  0.605*** 0.463*** 0.726*** 0.665*** 0.482*** 
    (0.032)  (0.048)  (0.026) (0.033) (0.034) (0.022) (0.028) 
Log of total GDP  0.023  -0.016  0.005  -0.032**  -0.001  -0.063***  -0.041** 
    (0.017)  (0.024)  (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.016) 
GDP per capita  0.008***  0.005*  0.019***  0.004**  0.005*  0.025***  0.011*** 
    (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Life expectancy at birth  -0.015**  -0.012  -0.035***  -0.003  0.021***  0.052***  0.002 
    (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) 
Adaptability of government policy  0.147***  0.227*** 0.129***  0.165***  0.147*** 0.172*** 0.184*** 
    (0.020)  (0.030)  (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.027) (0.018) 
Unemployment  rate  -0.002 -0.036***  -0.010**  0.004  0.007 0.013* 0.003 
    (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) 
Constant 1.754***  3.646***  3.789***  2.386***  -0.873  -3.235***  1.988*** 
    (0.493)  (0.692)  (0.498) (0.475) (0.539) (0.724) (0.455) 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  689  464  688 689 464 689 689 
R-squared  73.7%  69.0%  73.2% 62.6% 84.2% 92.3% 70.6% 37 
 
Table 6: Instrumental Variables Estimation 
Panel A: First-stage estimates 
Dependent Variable    Reporting  Reporting  Reporting Reporting Reporting Reporting Reporting 
Legal origin UK  -0.331***  -0.420*** -0.332*** -0.339*** -0.436*** -0.320*** -0.338*** 
   (0.059)  (0.073) (0.059) (0.060) (0.074) (0.059) (0.059) 
Legal origin French  -0.299***  -0.377*** -0.306*** -0.307*** -0.391*** -0.217*** -0.317*** 
   (0.060)  (0.078) (0.060) (0.060) (0.078) (0.066) (0.061) 
Legal origin Germany  -0.364***  -0.455*** -0.371*** -0.355*** -0.432*** -0.286*** -0.369*** 
   (0.058)  (0.076) (0.059) (0.058) (0.079) (0.062) (0.059) 
Lagged dependent variable§ 0.032***  0.071***  0.021*  0.017  0.064***  0.029***  -0.012 
    (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008) 
Log  of  total  GDP  0.044*** 0.048*** 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 
    (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) 
GDP per capita  0.002**  0.002*  0.003***  0.003***  0.001  0.002*  0.003*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Life expectancy at birth  0.002  0.005*  0.001  0.001  0.006**  -0.003  0.002 
    (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Adaptability of government policy  0.020**  0.003 0.020**  0.020** 0.008 0.016*  0.026*** 
    (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) 
Unemployment  rate  0.003** 0.009*** 0.004**  0.003** 0.009***  0.003*  0.003** 
    (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -0.405**  -0.820***  -0.340*  -0.329*  -0.782***  -0.072  -0.259 
    (0.197) (0.266) (0.189) (0.186) (0.267) (0.183) (0.181) 
Year  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  675 455 674 675 455 675 675 
R-squared  0.312 0.359  0.31  0.309 0.356 0.322 0.308 
OLS regressions. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
§ Each column corresponds to the lagged value of the seven (7) dependent variables of interest that we use in the second stage regression. 38 
 
Panel B: Second-stage estimates 














Reporting 2.191***  0.594**  1.742***  1.413***  0.237  1.744***  1.196*** 
    (0.382)  (0.234)  (0.335) (0.308) (0.192) (0.446) (0.261) 
Lagged dependent variable  0.667***  0.424***  0.615*** 0.505*** 0.750*** 0.647*** 0.507*** 
    (0.041)  (0.051)  (0.031) (0.033) (0.034) (0.029) (0.028) 
Log of total GDP  -0.019  -0.057**  -0.037  -0.056***  -0.005  -0.129***  -0.062*** 
    (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.023) (0.019) (0.016) (0.026) (0.019) 
GDP per capita  -0.001  0.002  0.011***  -0.001  0.005*  0.020***  0.006** 
    (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) 
Life expectancy at birth  -0.014  -0.010  -0.036***  -0.002  0.022***  0.061***  0.002 
    (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) 
Adaptability of government policy  0.193***  0.218***  0.131*** 0.213*** 0.158*** 0.214*** 0.199*** 
    (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.033) (0.021) 
Unemployment rate  -0.012*  -0.034***  -0.017***  -0.004  0.006  0.009  -0.002 
    (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) 
Constant 1.999***  4.007***  4.265***  2.305***  -1.093**  -3.381***  2.106*** 
    (0.672)  (0.686)  (0.582) (0.551) (0.513) (0.885) (0.505) 
Year  fixed  effects  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  675  455  674 675 455 675 675 
R-squared 0.491  0.621  0.563  0.497  0.841  0.884  0.628 
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.  





Table 7: Developed vs. Developing Countries 
Panel A: Developed Countries 














Reporting 0.377***  0.101  0.327***  0.286***  0.074  0.257*  0.223*** 
    (0.074)  (0.086)  (0.085) (0.063) (0.058) (0.141) (0.069) 
Lagged dependent variable  0.720***  0.606***  0.794*** 0.631*** 0.921*** 0.654*** 0.518*** 
    (0.045)  (0.051)  (0.036) (0.043) (0.038) (0.027) (0.035) 
Log of total GDP  -0.061***  -0.071***  -0.078***  -0.078***  0.014  -0.121***  -0.070*** 
    (0.017)  (0.026)  (0.023) (0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.015) 
GDP per capita  0.009***  -0.001  0.019***  0.005**  -0.003  0.023***  0.010*** 
    (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Life expectancy at birth  0.031  0.092***  -0.036  0.016  0.075***  0.060**  0.002 
    (0.022)  (0.029)  (0.026) (0.022) (0.017) (0.029) (0.017) 
Adaptability of government policy  0.167***  0.061**  0.115*** 0.192***  0.032  0.221*** 0.193*** 
    (0.022)  (0.031)  (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.038) (0.020) 
Unemployment rate  -0.004  -0.069***  0.009  0.023**  -0.020  0.052***  0.017* 
    (0.009)  (0.018)  (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.019) (0.009) 
Constant -1.450  -5.715**  3.284*  0.179  -5.777***  -3.610  1.998 
    (1.694)  (2.517)  (1.987) (1.686) (1.452) (2.229) (1.292) 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  387  253  387 387 253 387 387 
R-squared  71.5%  69.7%  72.7% 68.0% 85.0% 81.4% 69.2% 
 
OLS regressions. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   40 
 
Panel B: Developing Countries 














Reporting 0.022  0.396**  0.215  0.332  0.647*  -0.102  -0.101 
    (0.682)  (0.159)  (0.506) (0.328) (0.340) (0.231) (0.257) 
Lagged dependent variable  0.699***  0.282***  0.409*** 0.440*** 0.626*** 0.685*** 0.483*** 
    (0.045)  (0.062)  (0.043) (0.045) (0.049) (0.036) (0.039) 
Logged total GDP  0.168***  -0.065*  0.015  -0.015  -0.087**  -0.185***  -0.037 
    (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.028) (0.031) (0.035) (0.033) (0.042) 
GDP per capita  -0.025**  0.041***  0.042***  -0.030**  0.031***  0.036***  -0.010 
    (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Life expectancy at birth  -0.001  -0.038***  -0.043***  -0.010  -0.008  -0.005  -0.006 
    (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Adaptability of government policy  0.223***  0.425*** 0.222***  0.173***  0.264*** 0.262*** 0.207*** 
    (0.034)  (0.039)  (0.025) (0.031) (0.037) (0.030) (0.034) 
Unemployment  rate  0.013*  -0.030***  -0.013** -0.000  0.005 -0.017** -0.001 
    (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 
Constant -0.539  5.425***  4.643***  2.994***  1.513**  0.944  2.524*** 
    (0.813)  (0.842)  (0.648) (0.707) (0.763) (0.690) (0.842) 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  302  211  301 302 211 302 302 
R-squared  58.7%  66.0%  62.0% 51.3% 67.6% 82.9% 61.2% 
 
OLS regressions. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Firm-level Analysis 
Panel A: Energy / Sales 
Groups N  Before  After  Diffs-in-diffs 
Disclosure 58  5.98  6.07    
New Disclosure  16  5.13  5.08  -0.14 
p-value         0.048 
 
Panel B: Waste / Sales 
Groups N  Before  After  Diffs-in-diffs 
Disclosure 54  1.84  1.86    
New Disclosure  16  1.69  1.58  -0.13 
p-value         0.028 
 
Panel C: Water / Sales 
Groups N  Before  After  Diffs-in-diffs 
Disclosure 62  5.73  5.77    
New Disclosure  21  5.38  5.23  -0.19 
p-value         0.047 
 
Panel D: Training Hours / Employees 
Groups N  Before  After  Diffs-in-diffs 
Disclosure 42  31.63  30.92    
New Disclosure  26  21.60  25.48  4.59 
p-value         0.015 
 
Panel E: Training Costs / Employees 
Groups N  Before  After  Diffs-in-diffs 
Disclosure 20  6.83  6.66    
New Disclosure  9  6.76  7.59  1.00 
p-value         0.023 
 
Panel F: Board Attendance  
Groups N  Before  After  Diffs-in-diffs 
Disclosure 175  91.30  91.36    
New Disclosure  57  90.09  92.16  2.01 
p-value         0.123 
 
“Before” it the first year (t) of mandatory sustainability reporting in a country. “After” is two years after (t+2) the 
first year of mandatory sustainability reporting. “Disclosure” includes firms that disclosed the focal measure before 
mandatory sustainability reporting. “New Disclosure” includes firms that did not disclose the focal measure before 
mandatory sustainability reporting. p-values are based on one-tailed tests. Variables in Panels A-E are log-
transformed to mitigate the influence of extreme values. N is the number of unique firms in each portfolio. 42 
 
APPENDIX 1 
Definitions of Variables 
Variable Variable  Definition 
Social Responsibility  Social responsibility of business leaders is high (IMD WCY executive survey 
based on an index from 0 to 10) 
Sustainable Development  Sustainable development is a priority in companies. (IMD WCY executive 
survey based on an index from 0 to 10) 
Employee Training  Employee training is a high priority in companies (IMD WCY executive 
survey based on an index from 0 to 10) 
Corporate Boards  Corporate boards do supervise the management of companies effectively. 
(IMD WCY executive survey based on an index from 0 to 10) 
Ethical Practices  Ethical practices are implemented in companies. (IMD WCY executive 
survey based on an index from 0 to 10) 
Bribery & corruption  Bribing and corruption do not exist (IMD WCY executive survey based on an 
index from 0 to 10) 
Managerial Credibility  Credibility of managers in society is strong (IMD WCY executive survey 
based on an index from 0 to 10) 
Reporting  Takes the value of one for country-years after the enforcement of a law that 
mandates sustainability reporting. Otherwise it takes the value of zero. 
Enforcement 
Takes the value of one for country-years that score above median in the 
question “Are government decisions effectively implemented?” Otherwise it 
takes the value of zero. 
Assurance  Percentage of companies that provide third party assurance of their GRI 
compliant sustainability report. 
Life expectancy at birth  The average estimate for life expectancy at birth. 
Adaptability of 
government policy 
Adaptability of government policy to changes in the economy is high. (IMD 
WCY executive survey based on an index from 0 to 10) 




List of Mandatory and Voluntary Sustainability Reporting Guidelines between 1995 and 2008 
Country  Name of law/regulation  Note for law/regulation  ESG 
type 
Voluntary=1 
Mandatory=2  Year 
Australia  Corporations Act - Section 299(1)(f)  Subsection of business law  env  2  1998 
Australia  National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting 
Act  Stock exchange regulations  env  2  2007 
Australia  Financial Services Reform Act   Only financial institutions  esg  2  2001 
Austria  Amended Austrian Commercial Code (UGB), 
§243 Austrian Commercial Code (UGB), §243 
Subsection of business law / 
transposition of EU law  esg 2  2005 
Belgium  Social Balance Sheet  Subsection of business law  soc  2  2003 
Brazil  Ethos Indicators on Corporate Social 
Responsibility  Evaluation System  esg  1  2001 
Canada  The Canadian Environmental Protection Act,  Environmental law  env  2  1999 
Canada  The Bank Act - Section 459.3(1)  Only financial institutions  esg  2  2001 
Canada  Securities Comission (disclosure obligations 
of)  Stock exchange regulations  esg  2  2004 
Chile  Voluntary standards Guide for Preparing 
Sustainability Reports  CSR Guidelines  esg  1  2003 
Chile 
The economic dimension - social sustainability 
reports: towards basic quarterly financial 
statements 
CSR Reporting Model  esg  1  2006 
China   Environmental Information Disclosure Act  Environmental law  env  2  2008 
China  
Guidelines on Environmental Information 
Disclosure by Companies Listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Stock exchange regulations  env  2  2008 
China  
Shenzhen Stock Exchange Social 
Responsibility Guidelines for Listed 
Companies   
esg 1  2006 
China   Directive. "CSR Guideline for State-Owned 
Enterprises"  Decree esg  2  2008 
Denmark  Green Accounts Act  CSR-dedicated law  env  2  1995 
Denmark Social  Index,  2000  Tool  esg  1  2000 44 
 
Denmark  Danish Financial Statements Act  Subsection of business law  esg  2  2001 
Denmark 
Revision to Danish Financial Statements Act 
(The Social Responsibility for Large 
Businesses Law) 
Subsection of business law  esg  2  2009 
Finland  revised disclosure obligations in the 
Accounting Act 
Revision to Accounting 
standard  env 2  2006 
Finland  revised disclosure obligations in the 
Accounting Act 
Revision to Accounting 
standard  gov 2  2006 
Finland  Finnish Accounting Act   Subsection of Accounting 
standard  esg 2  1997 
France  ADEME Carbon Footprint methodology  Guidelines  env  2  2002 
France  NRE (Loi  n°2001-420 sur les Nouvelles 
Régulations Economiques)  Subsection of business law  esg  2  2003 
Germany Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz  (BilReG)  Subsection of Accounting 
standard  esg 2  2005 
Greece Law  3487  Transposition of EU law  esg  2  2006 
India  SEBI committee on Corp. Gove.  Governance  esg  1  2003 
India  CSR Notice  Only financial institutions  esg  1  2007 
Indonesia  Capital Markets Regulation No. X.K.6.  Stock exchange regulations  esg  2  2007 
Indonesia  Law No. 40/2007 Concerning Limited Liability 
Company Law  Subsection of business law  esg  2  2007 
Ireland  Credit Institutions Act   Only financial institutions  esg  2  2008 
Italy  Legislative decree no. 32/2007  Decree  esg  2  2007 
Japan  ELV Recycling Law  Only automobile industry  env  2  2002 
Japan  Law Concerning the Promotion of Business 
Activities with Environmental Consideration  Environmental law  env  2  2005 
Japan Environmental  Reporting  Guidelines  Guidelines  env  2  2007 
Luxembourg  The Ten Principles of Corporate Governance 
issued by the Luxembourg Stock Exchange  stock exchange regulations  gov  1  2006 
Malaysia N/A  (CSR-related  law)  Decree  esg  2  2007 
Netherlands 
Guidelines for the integration of social and 
environmental activities in the financial 
reporting of companies   
esg 1  2008 
Netherlands  Dutch Corporate Governance Code  Best practices  esg  1  2003 45 
 
Netherlands  Dutch Civil Code (1838 Section 2, Part 9, 
Article 2:391 subsection 1)  Transposition of EU law  esg  2  2004 
Netherlands  The Environmental Protection Act  Environmental law  esg  2  1999 
New Zealand  Guidelines  esg 1  2003 
Norway  Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate 
Governance  Code gov  1  2007 
Norway  Accounting Act § 3-3 (Regnskapsloven)  Subsection of accounting 
standard  esg 2  1998 
Portugal  The 29th Accounting Standard  Subsection of accounting 
standard  env 2  2004 
Portugal  Sustainability Report  Limited to Transp & Comm  esg  2  2006 
Singapore  Code of Corporate Governance  All publicly listed companies  gov  2  2007 
South Africa  Companies act  Subsection of business law  gov  2  2008 
South Africa  JSE Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) 
index  Stock exchange regulations  esg  1  2004 
South Africa  Second King Report on Corporate Governance  Subsection of business law  gov  1  2003 
Spain  Resolución de 25 de marzo de 2002 (Insitituto 
de Contabilidad y Auditoría de Cuentas) 
Subsection of Accounting 
standard  env 2  2002 
Sweden  Guidelines on Environmental Information in 
the director's report section  Guidelines env  1  1998 
Sweden  Amendment to the Annual Accounts Act  Subsection of Accounting 
standard  esg 2  2005 
United Kingdom  Combined Code  Subsection of Accounting 
standard  gov 2  2003 
United Kingdom  Environmental Reporting Guidelines  Guidelines  env  1  2006 
United Kingdom  Companies Act  Subsection of business law  esg  2  2006 
USA  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act  Subsection(s) of Business Law  gov  2  2002 
 